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THE SUPREME COURTS REJECTION OF GOVERNMENT
INDEMNIFICATION TO AGENT ORANGE MANUFACTURERS IN HERCULES, INC. V. UNITED STATES:
DISTINGUISHING THE FOREST FROM THE TREES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of
immunity afforded to contractors for damages resulting from
the performance of a government contract.- However, the extent of the government's responsibility to indemnify third party
claims resulting from a government contract has remained
relatively obscure. Without clear direction, courts rejected government indemnification, relying upon a variety of detailed
points of contract law which often concealed larger issues.2 In
an appellate court dissent, Judge Plager criticized this result,
warning that "undue attention to trees.., often hides the
forest."' Recently, in Hercules, Inc. v. United States,4 the Supreme Court addressed whether the United States Government
has an obligation to reimburse manufacturers for expenses
incurred from injuries caused by a product produced under a
government contract.

1. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (setting forth the
government contractor defense which shields private contractors from product liability
pursuant to a government contract).
2. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 992 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Unlike the majority, which compartmentalizes the companies' claims into
several separate doctrinal categories . . . I believe the companies' submissions, fairly
read, also set forth a much more general fact-based claim."); see also Lopez v. A.C. &
S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
3. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 205 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J.,
dissenting). According to Judge Plager, the "forest," or the fundamental issue which
was being overlooked was "[whether when] the Government compels manufacture of a
product by private companies, a product known to the Government to be potentially
dangerous, and the use by the Government of the product causes the manufacturers
to incur liability, [may] the Government claim immunity from the consequences of its
conduct?" Id.
4. 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
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Hercules, Inc. v. United States, consolidated with Win. T.
Thompson Co. v. United States, held that absent an express or
implied-in-fact agreement to indemnify manufacturers, government contractors may not seek contribution from the United
States for settling third party tort claims.5 The Supreme Court
relied upon precedent in finding the Tucker Act's 6 jurisdiction
to hear claims based upon any express or implied contract extends only to contracts which are express or implied-in-fact; it
does not confer jurisdiction to contracts which are determined
to be implied-in-law. The Court asserted that the circumstances surrounding the contract to produce the chemical Agent
Orange did not give rise to an implied-in-fact agreement.! Furthermore, section 707 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) did
not reveal an intent by Congress to indemnify manufacturers
for liabilities flowing from compliance with an order issued
under the Act.9 Finally, the Court suggested that the government contractor defense would have shielded the petitioners
from liability, although this was not explicitly stated in the
majority opinion."
This casenote examines the Court's decision in Hercules while
considering the impact upon indemnification to government
contractors. Specifically, Part II examines the scope of the
Tucker Act and the limitations upon implied-in-law contracts."
Part III identifies the relevant statutes and case law which
have formed the basis of immunity for government contractors.' Part IV describes the facts of the case, explains the reasoning of the lower federal courts and articulates the Supreme
Court's decision in Hercules.3 Part V analyzes the Court's rationale 4 and Part VI discusses the ramifications of the Court's
decision.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 985-86.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 985.
See id. at 987.
See id. at 988-89.
See id. at 986.
See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 26-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 89-156 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 157-193 and accompanying text.
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THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE TUCKER ACT

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States
may not be sued without its consent.' Before the passage of
the Tucker Act,' 6 grievances against the federal government

had to be submitted to Congress as private bills.' As the government expanded, the volume of private bills being submitted
for review created a significant burden on congressional resources and prompted the passage of the Tucker Act.'8 The
purpose of the Act is to serve as a waiver of sovereign immunity in certain contract situations. Specifically, the Tucker Act
confers jurisdiction upon the Claims Court to hear claims which
are based upon an "express or implied" contract with the United States.' An implied contract may either be implied-in-fact
or implied-in-law. An implied-in-fact contract is not formed
through express language; rather, it is suggested by the conduct
and actions of the parties indicating an understanding or agreement that a contract exists." On the other hand, an impliedin-law contract is not based upon an agreement between the
parties. Instead, the contract is based upon a duty which is imposed by law according to principles of justice and equity in
order to prevent unjust enrichment.2 ' Although the explicit
language of the Tucker Act does not prevent the court from
adjudicating implied-in-law contract claims, in Sutton v. United
States,' the Supreme Court determined that Claims Court

15. See Larry J. Gusman, Note, Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of
Powers?, 39 An. U. L. REV. 391, 392 (1990).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
17. See Jake T. Townsend, Comment, Ambulance Chasers Beware: Carley v.
Wheeled Coach and the Questionable Expansion of the Government Contractor Defense,
78 MINN. L. REV. 1545, 1549-50 (1994).
18. See id. at 1550.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). The statute provides in relevant part:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.

Id.
20. See BLACK'S LAW DICTioNARY 323 (6th ed. 1990).

21. See id.
22. 256 U.S. 575 (1921).
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jurisdiction extends only to contracts which are express or implied-in-fact.' Therefore, the United States may not be sued
based upon a contract which is determined to be implied-in-law.
This judicially created restriction on the court's implied contract
jurisdiction is based upon the standard that the waiver of sovereign immunity is to be narrowly construed in favor of the
Government.' This decision has been reiterated in a number
of Supreme Court opinions and has become a fairly established
standard.'
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT

CONTRACTOR

IMMUNITY

A. The Government ContractorDefense
While the Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity in contract claims, the Federal Tort Claims Act"5 (FTCA)
serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity in tort claims. Although the FTCA provides a broad waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity, there are several exceptions.
One exception, which forms the foundation of the government
contractor defense, provides that the FTCA does not apply to
claims which are based upon the "performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused." 7 The statute also
holds the government immune from any damage claim for inju-

23. See id. at 581.
24. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941); Quality Furniture
Rentals, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 136, 139 (1983).
25. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983); United States v.
Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S.
338, 341 (1925). But see United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 393-95 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (allowing recovery for government contracts which are "quasi-contracts" or
implied-in-law); Janowsky v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 706, 715-16 (1991).
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994); see AL. Haizlip, The Government Contractor
Defense in Tort Liability: A Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CONT. L.J. 116, 117-18
(1989).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994). The Supreme Court found that failure to warn of
certain hazards is within the discretionary function exception. See Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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ries to military service personnelY The primary purpose of the
government contractor defense is to extend immunity from
liability to contractors when a product is manufactured under a
government contract. '
1. The Feres-Stencel Doctrine
The foundation of the government contractor defense was
established in two Supreme Court decisions. First, in Feres v.
United States,0 the Supreme Court barred actions brought
under the FTCA against the government for service-related
injuries received by military personnel." In Feres, a serviceman died in a barracks fire while on active duty in the armed
forces. The executrix of the serviceman's estate claimed that the
United States had been negligent in quartering the decedent in
barracks which were known to be unsafe.3 2 The Court acknowledged that the relationship between the government and
members of the armed forces is "distinctively federal in character" and determined that Congress, in drafting the FTCA, did
not intend to create a cause of action for injuries to "servicemen
where the
injuries arise out of or are ...
incident to
33
service."
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States' extended
the scope of immunity to include third party actions against the
United States. A National Guard officer sued Stencel, a government contractor, and the United States for injuries incurred as
a result of a defective ejection system. 5 Stencel then crossclaimed against the United States for providing incorrect design
specifications and components.36 The Supreme Court held that

28. See 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1994).
29. See Emie Stewart, Comment, The Government Made Me Do It!: Has Boyle v.
United Technologies Extended the Government Contractor Defense Too Far?, 57 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 981, 981 (1992).
30. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
31. See id. at 146.

32. See id. at 136-37.
33. Id. at 143-44, 146.
34. 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977).
35. See id. at 667-68.
36. See id. at 668.
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the government is not liable under the FTCA to indemnify a
manufacturer for damages." Citing Feres, the Court found that
the "relationship between the Government and its suppliers ...
is certainly no less 'distinctively federal in character' than the
relationship between the Government and its soldiers."" Furthermore, allowing a claim would circumvent the limitation
upon liability established in Feres."9 A soldier would be able to
sue a manufacturer, and the manufacturer in turn could sue
the United States. Justice Burger, writing for the Court, observed that to allow recovery would be to 'judicially admit at
the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at
the front door. We do not believe that the [Federal Tort Claims]
Act permits such a result."'
2. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.41
Despite the Feres-Stencel doctrine, courts remained unclear
about the scope of immunity for contractors. For example, in
McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,' the Ninth Circuit allowed immunity under the government contractor defense
where a contractor developed detailed specifications and the
specifications were approved by the government.' On the other hand, in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.," the Eleventh
Circuit found a manufacturer immune under the government
contractor defense only if the contractor "did not participate, or
participated only minimally," in the design process or if the
contractor warned the government of the risks in the design,
offered an alternative, and was told to "proceed with the dangerous design" anyway.'

37. See id. at 673.
38. Id. at 672.
39. See id. at 673.
40. Id. (quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)).
41. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
42. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
43. See id. at 451.
44. 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988), reh'g denied,
487 U.S. 1250 (1988).
45. Id. at 745-46.
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Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.' clarified the government
contractor defense. In Boyle, a Marine was killed when the
helicopter in which he was flying crashed during a training
exercise.' Boyle's father brought suit against the helicopter
manufacturer, alleging that the manufacturer had defectively
repaired the helicopter's automatic flight control system.' The
Supreme Court recognized that state law cannot be preempted
absent a clear statutory provision or direct conflict between
state and federal law.49 A five-four majority identified a twopart test to determine when federal law may preempt state law
in order to apply the government contractor defense. The first
part requires the claim to involve "uniquely federal interests." 0 The Court reasoned that the imposition of liability on
government contractors would directly affect the interests of the
United States, as a contractor would either decline to manufacture goods according to government specifications or the contractor would raise its price.51 The second part of the test requires that the application of state law conflict with or
frustrate the objectives of federal legislation or a federal interest.52 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, asserted that "state
law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present
a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be displaced." 3 Boyle clarified the necessary circumstances required
to raise the government contractor defense. The Court announced that liability cannot be imposed upon a government
military contractor when "the United States approved reasonably precise specifications," the product conformed to the specifications, and the manufacturer notified the government of any
dangers in the use of the product of which the manufacturer
was aware.' Thus, even without a clear statutory provision,
the government contractor defense may preempt state tort law.

46. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
47. See id. at 502.
48. See id. at 503.

49. See id at 504.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 507.
52. See id. at 507-10.

53. Id. at 512.
54. See id.
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B. The Defense ProductionAct 5
Under the Defense Production Act (DPA), the President may
compel a manufacturer to perform and give priority to contracts
necessary to promote the national defense.56 However, section
707 of the DPA contains a provision to hold a manufacturer
harmless for any liabilities which may occur as a result of the
manufacturer's compliance with the DPA order.57 Specifically,
the section provides that "[n]o person shall be held liable for
damages or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting
directly or indirectly from compliance" with a government order. 8 Section 707 has rarely been litigated; the limited cases
which have construed section 707 have only interpreted the
section as excusing a contractor's breach of other nongovernment contracts in order to perform contracts under the DPA.59
Courts have found section 707 as revealing a clear intention
to extend a defense to manufacturers who cannot perform under one contract because a DPA contract has been given priority.' However, before Hercules, no case law addressed whether
the DPA's hold harmless provision may be construed to extend
indemnity to manufacturers. Therefore, the full scope of section
707 serving to indemnify a government contractor for settlement of a third party tort claim remained unclear prior to the
Hercules decision.

55. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 (1994).
56. See id. § 2071. The statute provides in relevant part, "[t]he President is authorized to require that performance under contracts or orders ...
which he deems
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense shall take priority over
performance under any other contract or order ....
" Id
57. See id § 2157 (originally enacted as the Defense Production Act of 1950, cI.
932, §707, 64 Stat. 818).
58. Id.

59. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d. 957, 997-98
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Texas Constr. Co, 224 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1955).
60. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 532 F.2d. at 997.
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Implied

Under an implied warranty of specifications, the United
States warrants that following specifications supplied by the
government will not expose a manufacturer to unforeseen consequences. 6' A claim for an implied warranty of specification requires proof that a valid warranty existed, that the warranty
was breached, and that the damages were caused by the
breach.62 In United States v. Spearin," the Supreme Court
recognized a right of action for breach of implied contract warranties." Spearin contracted to build a dock at a shipyard, a
project which called for the relocation of a storm sewer.' The
government furnished detailed plans and specifications which
were later found to be defective.66 Spearin did not complete
the contract and then sued the government for the balance due
and lost profits.6' The Court held that "if [a] contractor is
bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by
the [government], the contractor will not be responsible for the
consequences of defects in the plans and specifications."6 According to the Court, even if the contractor had inspected the
site where the sewer was to be replaced, the ultimate responsibility still remained with the government.69
Although damages occurred during performance of the contract in Spearin, the Court of Claims in Poorvu v. United
States70 expanded an implied warranty of specifications to apply in situations beyond the time of performance.71 In Poorvu,

61. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 986 (1996) (citing United
States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918)).
62. See San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
63. 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
64. See id. at 138.
65. See id. at 133.
66. See id. at 133-34.
67. See id. at 133.
68. Id. at 136.
69. See id. at 136-37.
70. 420 F.2d 993 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
71. See id. at 1000.
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the government eliminated support pilings from the plans of a
post office parking area in an effort to save money. 2 This was
done despite objections by the contractor. Five years later, as
a result of pressure from the parking lot and the absence of
support pilings, breaks occurred in the water line which caused
severe settlement damage to the post office.' The court determined that it was irrelevant that the deficiency in the plans
did not manifest itself until several years after construction of
the post office, stating "[i]t would make little sense to impose
the obligation of an implied warranty and then limit the life of
the warranty to the period of construction."75 Furthermore, the
Poorvu court rejected an argument by the government that a
Spearin warranty was not created because the contractor knew
of the dangerous conditions, and therefore, he could not have
relied upon the plans and specifications. 8
In Lopez v. AC. & S., Inc.,77 the Federal Circuit rejected an
argument based upon Spearin that an implied warranty by the
government regarding the use of a product would not lead to
third party claims against the contractor.7 8 Lopez involved asbestos manufacturers who sought government indemnification
for settlements with shipyard workers who had inhaled asbestos dust from products supplied under Navy contracts." The
court found it necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding the contract to determine whether an implied-in-fact
warranty existed."0 Lopez distinguished the construction contract in Spearin from a contract to supply a product, citing the
"massive detail" that the government provides in a construction
contract as evidence of an implied-in-fact warranty."' Lopez
also distinguished Ordnance Research, Inc. v. United States, 2

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 996.
See id.
See id. at 997.
Id. at 1000.
See id.
858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
See id. at 716-17.
See id. at 713.
See id. at 715-16.
Id at 715.
609 F.2d 462 (Ct. C1. 1979).
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which found an implied-in-fact warranty existed in a contract to
supply bomb igniters because the government had provided very
detailed specifications.' The Ordnance court stated "[w]hen
the government issues design specifications of a detailed nature... it warrants the sufficiency and efficacy of those specifications to produce the desired product in a satisfactory manner."" The Lopez court, on the other hand, determined that
the manufacturers themselves played a substantial role in developing the specifications and therefore, the circumstances
surrounding the contract did not give rise to an implied-in-fact
contract." Thus, the claim was beyond the court's jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act.86
Lopez also addressed government contractor immunity, recognizing the inconsistency which occurs when a manufacturer who
is exposed to tort claims due to compliance with government
specifications seeks indemnity from the government. This
inconsistency arises because under the government contractor
defense, the manufacturer is immune from liability and, consequently, there should be no need for a claim for contribution or
indemnity.88
IV. HERCULES, INC. V. UNITED STATES

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Hercules, Inc. and Thompson Chemical Corp." (Thompson)
were among nine manufacturers who were required to produce
Agent Orange under the authority of the DPA. The military
prescribed the formula for Agent Orange and provided further

83. See id. at 479.
84. Id
85. See Lopez, 858 F.2d at 715-16.
86. See id. at 716.
87. See iti at 718.
88. See id
89. In later litigation, Thompson Chemical Corp. is referred to as Wm. T. Thompson Co. See, e.g., Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17 (1992).
90. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F.Supp. 1263, 1265, 1272 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); see also Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 191 (1994).
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instructions, such as the marks which were to appear on the containers.9 ' The manufacturers followed all of the guidelines established by the government. Agent Orange was used as a defoliant during the Vietnam War to destroy food supplies and eliminate enemy hiding places. 2
After the war, thousands of Vietnam veterans filed lawsuits
against the manufacturers of Agent Orange, including Hercules
and Thompson.93 The veterans claimed they suffered health
problems from exposure to the chemical dioxin which was present in Agent Orange. 4 These health problems included skin
and respiratory irritations as well as various forms of cancer. 5
The veterans also claimed that exposure to Agent Orange
caused their children to be born with congenital birth defects. 6
The lawsuits were consolidated in a class action suit in the
Eastern District of New York. The district court judge accepted Hercules' and Thompson's claim 'of immunity from liability
under the government contractor defense, because the government and military had much more knowledge of the hazards
associated with dioxin than the chemical companies.98 In addition, the Agent Orange produced by Hercules, Inc. was not
found to contain any measurable dioxin.99 The case was reassigned, however, before final summary judgment was entered."° Upon reassignment, Chief Judge Weinstein withdrew
the decision and set the case for a jury trial to determine

91. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. at 1274; see also
Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 983 (1996).
92. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 191 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Twelve
million gallons of Agent Orange were used to defoliate 4.5 million acres of land in
Vietnam. See FRED A. WILCOX, WAITING FOR AN ARMY TO DIE: THE TRAGEDY OF
AGENT ORANGE, at xii (1989).
93. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
94. See Wilcox, supra note 92, at xxi-xxii.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See In re Agent Orange Prod Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
98. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1278 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). The court determined that under the government contractor defense the defendant is required to prove that the government established specifications for Agent Orange; the Agent Orange manufactured by the defendants met the government specifications in all material respects; and that the government knew as much -or more
than the defendant about the hazards. See id. at 1274.
99. See id. at 1274.
100. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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whether the manufacturers were entitled to raise the government contractor defense,' ° ' because at the time there was no
consistent standard to determine whether immunity could be

extended to private contractors.
Before the trial in May 1984, the chemical manufacturers
settled the case for $180 million. °2 Based upon a market
share, Hercules contributed $18.8 million and Thompson contributed $3.1 million toward the settlement price.0 3 Litigation
and attorney fees for Hercules and Thompson amounted to
more than $9 million.' ° Recovery against the United States
theories of contribution and noncontractual indemniunder tort
10 5
ty failed.

Hercules and Thompson filed separate actions against the
government in the United States Court of Claims,' seeking
to recover their share of the class action settlement and litigation costs.0 7 The court granted summary judgment for the
United States, stating that because Hercules and Thompson
had been insulated by the government contractor defense, they
were not entitled to indemnification.' The court was uncertain about whether an implied-in-fact warranty of specifications

101. See id. at 1244; see also Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 983
(1996).
102. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). Summary judgment was later granted against the veterans who sued as individuals outside of the
class action. The district court indicated that the veterans had not shown a credible
link between exposure to Agent Orange and their injuries. Additionally, the court
determined that the chemical manufacturers were immunized from liability by the
government contractor defense. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp.
1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988).
103. See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17, 21 (1992); Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 616, 620 (1992).
104. See Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 21; Hercules, 25 Cl. Ct. at 620.
105. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1987).
106. Congress changed the title of the Claims Court in 1992. The current title is
the United States Court of Federal Claims. Federal Courts Administration Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.
107. See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 CL Ct. 17 (1992); Hercules,
Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 616 (1992).
108. See Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 28, 30-35; Hercules, 25 C1. Ct. at 628-33.
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could be found from the circumstances; however, the court rejected the claim, concluding there was no evidence that Agent
Orange was the cause of the injuries."° Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the contractors' voluntary settlement could
not be viewed as damages which were reasonably foreseeable,
as the government contractor defense would have barred the
manufacturers' liability had the suit gone to trial."
Hercules' and Thompson's claims based upon superior knowledge and duty to act in good faith were also rejected."' The
superior knowledge doctrine allows government contractors to
recover damages when the government has superior knowledge
regarding problems in completing performance or production." This doctrine had been applied when a contractor performs without knowledge or information which may have affected the cost or duration, when the government is aware that the
contractor did not have the information, when the contract
specifications misled the contractor, and when the government
failed to provide the relevant information."' Under a theory of
duty to act in good faith, Hercules asserted that the government breached this duty by failing to "provide identification of
[Agent Orange's] active ingredients or give warnings concerning
its proper use."" In denying the claims based upon superior
knowledge and duty to act in good faith, the court observed
that previous cases had involved damages for increased performance costs and not post performance expenditures associated
with third-party tort litigation."

109. See Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 24-28; Hercules, 25 CL Ct. at 625-28.
110. See Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 33-34; Hercules, 25 Cl. Ct. at 631-32.
111. See Thompson, 26 CL. Ct. at 24; Hercules, 25 CL. Ct. at 623.
112. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 75, 77 (1981); Helene
Curtis Indus., Inc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 777 (1963) (holding that because
the government was aware that a contractor reasonably assumed it could perform a
contract without utilizing a grinding process, and because the government knew
grinding was necessary and failed to inform the contractor, the government was liable
for breach of contract).
113. See American Ship Bldg. Co., 654 F.2d at 79; Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 312
F.2d at 777.
114. Hercules, 25 Cl. Ct. at 623.
115. See Thompson, 26 CL. Ct. at 23-24; Hercules 25 CL. Ct. at 622-24.
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The court also denied a theory for contribution based upon a
reverse warranty."6 Under the reverse warranty theory, Hercules argued that the government breached an implied-in-fact
obligation to exercise due care when handling Agent Orange to
avoid potential health risks."7 In rejecting this claim, the
court noted "an implied warranty relating to the use by the
buyer after delivery, and warranting it would not harm the
seller is novel, and no reason is shown why anyone could have
so supposed at the date of sale by any inference from the circumstances.""'
The court also dismissed Thompson's claim of implied contractual indemnification." Thompson argued that section 707
of the DPA constituted an implied promise to indemnify for any
liabilities incurred in performing under the DPA. The court
found that the purpose of section 707 was to serve as immunity
for a government contractor who had breached another nongovernmental contract as a result of compliance with a DPA
order." Section 707, however, did not create a promise of indemnification.'
B. The U.S. Court of Appeals Decision
A divided Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed
the decision of the claims court, finding that Hercules and
Thompson could have invoked the government contractor defense and, therefore, the manufacturers assumed liability by
settling the claims.' 3 According to the court, if the class action litigation had been pursued to completion, rather than
settled, the government contractor defense would have barred
tort liability.' The claim under an implied warranty of specifications failed because the settlement constituted an interven-

116. See Hercules, 25 CL Ct. at 624.
117. See id.
118. Id. (quoting Lopez v. A.C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989)).
119. Thompson, 26 CL. Ct. at 28-29.
120. See id. at 28.
121. See id. at 29.
122. See id.
123. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 198-200 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
124. See id at 200.
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ing cause between the alleged breach and damages.' Furthermore, the court of appeals agreed that section 707 of the
DPA served only as a defense for a contractor facing suits from
non-government customers where the contractor had breached
another contract in order to comply with a DPA order. 6 The
court found no basis7 for determining section 707 created a right
to indemnification. 1

In a strong dissent, Circuit Judge Plager was not persuaded
that Hercules and Thompson would have prevailed on the government contractor defense if they had proceeded to trial."
Judge Plager noted that the status of the government contractor defense was uncertain at the time of the Agent Orange
settlement. 9 The fact that the initial summary judgment had
been revoked was evidence that the manufacturers could not be
certain that this defense would have barred them from liability.' Additionally, Judge Plager determined that the hold
harmless provision in section 707 should be extended to require
the government to indemnify contractors for all damages incurred as a result of compliance with a DPA contract, because
the government had, in effect, seized control of the contractors'
companies."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
question of whether the government is required to reimburse a
contractor
for damages incurred as a result of third party tort
32
claims."

C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Circuit holding that a government contractor may not receive indemnity for settlement of a third party tort claim; however, the
Court concluded that the claim was more appropriately ad-

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id at 197-98.
id. at 203-04.
id.
id. at 206-08.
id.
id. at 205-06.
id. at 209.
Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1425 (1995).
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dressed by the jurisdictional limitations under the Tucker
Act." s The lower courts had assumed the existence of an implied contract, but found Hercules and Thompson could not
recover damages because they were not able to prove causation
between the breach and the damages.'" The Supreme Court's
majority opinion did not reach the "no causation" holding, because it found that the evidence did not suggest an implied-infact contract which would permit jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held
that the Spearin doctrine, which releases a contractor from
consequences of defects in plans and specifications during performance, does not extend to create a warranty for third party
claims against a contractor."' Therefore, the United States
The
was not responsible to reimburse the manufacturers.'
Court reasoned that the government would not have contemplated a warranty that would extend to third party claims,
stating "the Government would avoid such an obligation, bea contraccause reimbursement through contract would provide
38
tor with what is denied to it through tort law."'
Additionally, the Court did not agree with Thompson's argument that an implied-in-fact agreement to indemnify a contractor existed, because the government "required Thompson to
produce [Agent Orange] under the authority of the DPA...
imposed detailed specifications, [and] had superior knowledge of
the hazards."'39 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), which "bars a federal employee or agency
from entering into a contract for future payment of money...
in excess of an existing appropriation."' Absent an express
provision in an appropriation for reimbursement, the ADA
would not allow indemnification on grounds that it would

133. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 985 (1996).

134. See id at 984-85.
135. Id. at 985-89.
136. See id. at 986.
137. See id. at 986.
138. Id. (citing Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977)).
139. Id. at 987.
140. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994)). The statute provides in relevant
inpart, "[aln officer or employee of the United State Government... may not ...
volve [the] government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before
an appropriation is made unless authorized by law." 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994).
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amount to an obligation of funds not yet appropriated.' 4 ' The
majority reasoned that the contracting government officer would
have had knowledge of the ADA and the existence of statutes
which allow government agents to expressly provide an indemnity agreement to contractors under certain conditions.' If an
implied agreement to indemnify could arise merely from the
circumstances of contracting, the statutes would have been
"entirely unnecessary."" According to the Court, this logic
prevents the inference that the contract included an implied-infact indemnity agreement.' In response to Thompson's argument that the ADA only applies to express contracts, the majority cited Sutton v. United States, which stated "[t]he limitation
upon the authority to impose contract obligations upon the
United States is as applicable to contracts by implication as it
is to those expressly made.""
The majority agreed with the lower courts in finding section
707 of the DPA does not include an intent to hold manufacturers harmless for any liabilities which result from compliance
with an order issued under the DPA.' The Court declined to
interpret the full scope of section 707, stating the statute "clearly functions only as an immunity,
and provides no hint of a
14 7
further agreement to indemnify."
Finally, the Court dismissed an argument based upon "simple
fairness," explaining that the Court does not have jurisdiction
over claims "based merely on equitable considerations."' The
simple fairness argument was also weakened by Feres v. United
States,'4 9 which held that the injured veterans could not recover damages from the government themselves.'
During
oral arguments, Justice Scalia responded to a statement by the

141. See California-Pacific Util. Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. C1. 703, 715 (1971).
142. See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 988; see also 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (1994) (allowing
indemnity provisions in military contracts for research and development).
143. Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 988.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 988 (quoting Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 580 (1921)).
146. See id. at 988-89.
147. Id. at 989 n.14.
148. Id. at 989 (quoting United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212,
217-18 (1926)).
149. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
150. See id. at 146.
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attorney representing the chemical companies that the case was
about simple fairness, rationalizing, "[slhould we be outraged
that the companies cannot pass on their liability [to the government], when the injured parties themselves cannot recover
[from the government]?" 15 '
D. The Supreme Court's Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, was unconvinced
that Hercules and Thompson were unable to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact warranty.1 52 The dissent argued
that the majority was incorrect in "compartmentalizing" the
companies' claims into categories and rejecting each separately
rather than examining the general circumstances which may
have given rise to an implied-in-fact contract."5 The dissent
did not specifically rule upon whether the facts revealed the
existence of an implied-in-fact contract,'TM instead the dissent
criticized the rationale of the majority.
According to the dissent, the majority's implication that a
contracting officer would not have agreed to an implied promise
of indemnity was ill-founded in light of the language of the
1964 statutes and regulations which was "nonspecific [and]
ambiguous on the procedures required for indemnification." 5
Similarly, the dissent found nothing to prevent a Spearin claim
from extending beyond the time of performance to third party
claims against the contractor, as asserted by the defendants.
Furthermore, the dissent rejected the court of appeals' finding
that a settlement was unforeseeable and therefore severed the
causation between the implied promise and the harm. 7 The

151. Brian D. Shannon, Analysis-Court to Decide Whether Government Contractors
Who Settled Agent Orange Litigation May Pursue Implied Warranty or Indemnification
Claims Against U.S., west's Legal News 9417, Dec. 4, 1995, at 27, available in 1995
WL 877107 (quoting Oral Argument, Official U.S. Supreme Court Transcript, Oct. 30,
1995, at 4, available in 1995 WL 64597).
152. See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 990-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 991-92.
154. See id. at 994.
155. Id. at 992.
156. See id. at 993.
157. See id. at 991.
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dissent concluded that without the benefit of hindsight, the
settlement was foreseeable as a "reasonable litigation strategy"
to avoid added litigation costs and the threat of significant
additional liability.1"
V. ANALYZING HERCULES, INC. V. UNITED STATES
A. Contract Circumstances Suggest DPA's Hold Harmless
Provision Allows Indemnification
The Hercules majority correctly asserted that section 707
should not be interpreted to include indemnification. 59 Although nothing in the language would prevent a broad extension, arguably Congress intended only to provide immunity for
DPA contractors and did not intend to impose liability upon the
government when it drafted the DPA. Nevertheless, the dissent
found it was unnecessary to address the actual intent of Congress."6 Instead, the dissent framed the issue upon the "risks
[that] contracting officers at the time might have thought the
Government was assuming" based upon the language in section
707.161 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the effect of the

language of the hold harmless provision must be viewed in
light of the surrounding circumstances.'62 The stated objective
of the DPA to relieve manufacturers of involuntarily created
liability could have reasonably led a contracting officer at the
time, and under the particular circumstances, to believe that a
warranty existed to hold a manufacturer harmless for future
third-party tort claims."
The Court also determined that the ADA would prevent contracting officers from making implied warranties, reasoning that

158. See id.
159. See id. at 988-89.

160. See id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. See id.

163. See id.
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if an express warranty is illegal, then an implied warranty
must also be illegal.' The court was reluctant to adopt this
reasoning in Lopez v. AC. & S., Inc.,'6 5 arguing that a standing appropriation exists to pay court judgments in these types
of situations. 6 ' The Lopez court also expressed doubt regarding an interpretation that implied warranties are illegal, because the rationale would severely limit all Spearin warranties,
including those implied-in-fact."6 7 Furthermore, this interpretation effectively insulates the government from any warranty
and disregards the intent of the contracting parties."
B. Spearin Does Not Limit Implied Warranty of Specifications
1. Precedent Does Not Suggest Spearin Should be Limited
The Hercules majority assumes that Congress would not have
intended to extend the Spearin doctrine to include third-party
tort claims beyond the performance of the contract.'69 This assumption ignores the fact that recovery under an implied warranty of specifications has been granted when a claim is
brought by a third-party during the performance of a contract,
such as in Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. WilliamsMcWilliams Co. Furthermore, courts have allowed recovery
when a claim is brought by the manufacturer after performance, such as in Poorvu v. United States.' In Hercules, the
Court offered no rationale to deny recovery for claims which are
brought after performance and involve a third-party action.

164. See id. at 987-88.
165. 858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
166. See id. at 716.
167. See id.
168. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 987-88 (1996).
169. See id. at 986.
170. 551 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery against government for damages owed by a contractor to a third party).
171. 420 F.2d 993 (Cl. Ct. 1970) (allowing recovery after time of contract performance).
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2. Government Contractor Defense is Misapplied
The Hercules majority also misapplies the government contractor defense. First, the majority cited Stencel as evidence
that a contracting government official would not have made an
implied warranty to indemnify for defects, reasoning that the
official would have been aware that the manufacturer was
granted immunity under the government contractor defense." 2
Although the Court acknowledged that Stencel postdated the
signing of the contracts, Chief Justice Rehnquist found it convincing that Stencel had been supported by several earlier decisions which suggested immunity for government manufacturers.'73 The majority disregards the fact that very few circuits
recognized this immunity at the time the contracts were
signed.'74 Additionally, the courts which recognized this immunity held the defense was a matter of state law, which was
subject to change in several states. 75 The Supreme Court previously had held that the government contractor defense should
not create immunity rights unless expressly created by Congress,'76 and Congress repeatedly had refused to immunize
government contractors.'77 In fact, the scope of the government contractor defense was not clear until Boyle was decided
by the Court in 1988."78 It is submitted that a government
contracting officer would not have been expected to rely upon
an unclear and unresolved doctrine as a substitute for an implied warranty of specifications. 9
172. See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 986 n.6.
173. See id.
174. See id. See also, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th
Cir. 1964).
175. See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 991; United Air Lines, 335 F.2d at 404.
176. See Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1943) ("[Wf this authority to carry out the project... was within the constitutional power of Congress,
there is no liability on the part of the contractor.... ") (quoting Yearsley v. Ross
Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940)).
177. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 & n.1 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. 2378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 4765,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 5883, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 1504, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5351, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
178. See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Plager, J., dissenting).
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The majority also misapplies the government contractor defense in holding that a contractor could not obtain through
contract what is denied through tort law. 80 This directly conflicts with the ruling in Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United
States, 1 where the Supreme Court stated
we fail to see how the Stencel holding... supports the
conclusion that if the [FTCA] bars a tort remedy, neither is
there a contractual remedy. The absence of Government tort
liability [does not] bar contractual remedies on implied-infact18contracts,
even in those cases also having elements of a
2
tort.

C. Existence of Claims Court JurisdictionUnder Tucker Act
1. Plain Language of Tucker Act Does Not Reveal a Limitation
on Implied-in-Law Contracts
The plain language of the Tucker Act confers jurisdiction to
contracts which are "express or implied."" In a number of
-decisions, the Court ignored the literal language of the Tucker
Act and imposed its own interpretation limiting jurisdiction of
implied contracts to those implied-in-fact."' The Hercules majority cited Sutton v. United States" and several other cases
to support this position;" however, none of these cases offer
justification or rationale for this rule."' Sutton identified
United States v. North American Transportation & Trading
Co.1 as a foundation for this standard, but North American
never states nor considers this rule. 9 Therefore, neither the

180. See Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 986.
181. 444 U.S. 460 (1980) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 465.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1994).
184. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983); United States v.
Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S.
338, 341 (1925); Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581 (1921).
185. 256 U.S. 575 (1921).
186. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 985 (1996).
187. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983); United States v.
Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S.
338, 341 (1925); Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581 (1921).
188. 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
189 See it.
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plain language of the Tucker Act nor case law reveals a justification for the limitation upon implied-in-law contracts." °
2. Circumstances of Agent
Implied-in-Fact Contract

Orange

Contract

Suggest

an

The majority's determination that jurisdiction did not exist
under the Tucker Act is based upon a very narrow interpretation of the circumstances of the contract which create an implied warranty of specifications. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited
Lopez as authority that "a Spearin warranty within a...
contract must be implied in fact."' 9 ' However, the Court failed to
address the substance of the Lopez decision, which found that
absent circumstances justifying an inference that a warranty
could have been supposed at the date of contracting, such a
warranty could not be implied-in-fact. 92 Lopez suggests that
an examination of all circumstances surrounding the contract is
necessary to determine whether a contract is implied-in-fact.
The Lopez court indicated that detailed specifications provided
by the government which state "just how to do the job" are
indicia of an implied-in-fact warranty.'
Furthermore, the
court noted that in the Lopez situation, the government "might
reasonably suppose [the asbestos manufacturers] knew enough
about asbestos and its perils not to need to learn more about it
from the government." 9 ' In Hercules, there is no evidence
that the chemical manufacturers had any prior information
regarding the production of Agent Orange and its dangers.

190. This occurrence has been criticized by two authors who have suggested that
an explicit amendment should be added to the Tucker Act granting jurisdiction for
contracts which are implied-in-law. See Willard L. Boyd & Robert K. Huffman, The
Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel
in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 620-21 (1991). One
argument for this amendment reveals that in certain situations, courts have "ignored
the distihction between implied in fact contracts and implied in law contracts in order to find an implied in fact contract and allow recovery." Michael C. Walch, Note,
Dealing with a Not-So-Benevolent Uncle: Implied Contracts with Federal Agencies, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1985).
191. Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 985.
192. See Lopez v. A-C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
193. See id. at 715-16.
194. Id. at 716; see also G.F. Corp. v. United States, 932 F.2d 947, 950 (Fed.
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
195. Id. at 717.
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Therefore, in light of Lopez, the fact that the government compelled the manufacturing of Agent Orange under the authority
of the DPA, had superior knowledge regarding the dangers of
Agent Orange, and provided detailed specifications regarding its
production, suggest adequate "additional circumstances" to create an implied-in-fact contract in Hercules.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Hercules, the Supreme Court incorrectly denied indemnification to government contractors by failing to examine the
particular circumstances surrounding the contract. The result of
this narrow focus suggests the Court has adopted a stricter
attitude regarding liability of the United States, even when the
government in effect seizes control of a company. The decision
to reject indemnification to government contractors should have
little or no effect upon other manufacturers under similar circumstances. The government contractor defense now clearly
conveys immunity to manufacturers performing under a military contract 95 and, therefore, it is unlikely that a Hercules
type situation should arise again. Nevertheless, it has been
argued under Boyle, that the government contractor defense is
ambiguous with regard to whether immunity should be extended to manufacturers of nonmilitary products." 7 Therefore,
there is still a question of whether Hercules will insulate the
government from indemnity for a contractor who performs under a nonmilitary contract.
An examination of public policy and the basis for rejecting
indemnification reveals the majority's reasoning is necessary to
protect the federal government from extensive liability. Allowing
indemnification may encourage manufacturers to settle claims
and then seek reimbursement from the United States. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly unjust for the government to benefit
at the expense of others. Justice Breyer expressed his "fear that
the practical effect of disposing of the companies' claim ... will
make it more difficult... for courts to interpret Government

196. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
197. See Stewart, supra note 29, at 1013; Townsend, supra note 17, at 1546
(1994).
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contracts with an eye towards fair allocation of risks that the
parties likely intended."'98 As this casenote suggests, Hercules
assumed a very narrow interpretation of circumstances surrounding the contract to deny indemnification to government
contractors. In doing so, the Court has missed the forest for the
trees.

KaCey Reed

198. Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 994 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

